For analysts who track China’s nuclear modernization

# China’s nuclear weapons lab and its nuclear power plants buy from two supply chains that almost never touch.

We read 7,642 public procurement notices and drew both sides as one network.

324

firms named as winners at the weapons lab

149

firms named as winners at the power plants

2

on both lists, of 471

- **01**The weapons lab names 324 firms as winners, in 337 of its 2,001 notices.
- **02**Reactor institutes and fuel plants that serve both programs name 299.
- **03**Nuclear power buyers name 149.
- **04**12 names cross between sides, and 2 of them link the weapons lab to the power plants.
- **05**Foreign sellers, in blue: 34 of 149 at the power plants and 0 of 324 at the weapons lab.

### 93 of the 107 weapons-lab tenders that say whether imports may bid say no.

Power plants*1,783 of 3,959*

Weapons lab*3 of 2,001*

### The power plants buy through the international-tender portal, and the weapons lab does not.

A firm is the name a notice prints, so one firm spelled two ways counts twice, and 1,559 of the 2,001 weapons-lab notices are from 2020. Position in the drawing is a layout aid.

This is one question, asked of data we already hold.

We collect Chinese procurement notices from government and state-enterprise tender portals and listings from chemical marketplaces, and we build networks from them, such as China’s semiconductor supply chain. Your analysts and your agents reach it through a search API, an MCP server, or files delivered with an analyst.

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